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I. INTRODUCTION
Sofia Vergara and her ex-fiancé, Nick Loeb, created and stored
several pre-embryos with the intention of using them to start a family together. Since then, the two have separated and now dispute the
fate of the pre-embryos they created. Should the pre-embryos be considered persons, property, or something else? Should they be afforded
the right to life because one party wants them to develop or should
they be discarded because one party no longer wants to procreate?
Who should decide? The lack of regulation in the area of assisted reproductive technology leaves these sensitive disputes in the hands of
courts and raises many questions. This Note will provide an answer.
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a process typically used by couples1
trying to overcome infertility.2 The IVF process involves the fertiliza* J.D. 2015, cum laude, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to
thank my parents, Phil and Esperanza Steinmiller, for loving and supporting me; and
Professor Mary Ziegler for challenging me to think about the legal implications of assisted
reproductive technology and guiding me through the writing process.
1. The use of the term “couples” is not meant to create a distinction regarding sexual
orientation or marital status of the parties.
2. Melissa Conrad Stöppler, In Vitro Fertilization, EMEDICINEHEALTH,
http://www.emedicinehealth.com/in_vitro_fertilization/article_em.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2016). Infertility is the inability of a couple to become pregnant after one year of unprotected sex without using birth control methods. Id. Infertility affects nearly 6.1 million people
in the United States, yet less than five percent of infertile couples utilize IVF treatment.
Id.
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tion of a woman’s eggs by a man’s sperm in a laboratory to create a
pre-embryo.3 Once a pre-embryo is created, it is implanted into the
uterus of either the genetic mother or a surrogate in hopes of achieving pregnancy and childbirth.4 Couples are typically advised to fertilize multiple pre-embryos and implant several pre-embryos into the
woman’s uterus at one time to increase chances of pregnancy.5 Many
couples choose to cryogenically preserve the remaining pre-embryos
they produce.6 Cryogenic preservation involves freezing and storing
pre-embryos for future use. These frozen pre-embryos may be thawed
and transferred into a woman’s uterus to develop, donated to another
infertile couple, discarded, implanted when pregnancy is unlikely,
donated for research, or kept frozen indefinitely.7 Deciding to freeze
pre-embryos may provide several benefits to a couple seeking to procreate, such as reducing the cost of undergoing additional procedures
to extract eggs, increasing the likelihood of achieving childbirth by
making pre-embryos available for implantation at a later time, or
allowing a couple to postpone procreation until they are ready to
have children.8 However, the option of freezing pre-embryos opens
the door for couples’ circumstances to change by, for example, having their desired child and not needing to utilize the remaining pre-

3. Id. The egg and sperm create a one-cell zygote, which undergoes successive equal
divisions until it is composed of eight cells. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn.
1992). “While this entity is not technically an embryo because it has not been permitted to
develop beyond an eight-cell entity, the majority of courts and scholars refer to these cells
as preembryos.” Angela K. Upchurch, The Deep Freeze: A Critical Examination of the Resolution of Frozen Embryo Disputes Through the Adversarial Process, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
395, 395 n.4 (2005) (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594).
4. Stöppler, supra note 2.
5. Nivin Todd, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/
infertility-and-reproduction/guide/in-vitro-fertilization?page=2 (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
According to a 2009 report by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on IVF
in the United States: “Pregnancy was achieved in an average of 29.4% of all cycles (higher
or lower depending on the age of the woman),” and “[t]he percentage of cycles that resulted
in live births was 22.4% on average (higher or lower depending on the age of the woman).”
Id. According to the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), in 2012 the percentage of cycles resulting in pregnancies in women under 35 years of age was 46.7%, and
the percentage of cycles resulting in live births was 40.7%. Clinic Summary Report, SART,
https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR_PublicMultYear.aspx?ClinicPKID=0 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2016).
6. David I. Hoffman et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their
Availability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 1063 (2003).
7. See Amy Demma, How Do I Make a Decision About My Remaining Embryos? What
Are My Options?, RESOLVE FOR THE JOURNEY & BEYOND (2013), http://www.resolve.org/
family-building-options/donor-options/how-do-i-make-a-decision-about-my-remainingembryos.html; Todd, supra note 5.
8. See Fotini Antonia Skouvakis, Defining the Undefined: Using a Best Interests Approach to Decide the Fate of Cryopreserved Preembryos in Pennsylvania, 109 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 885, 886, 888 (2005); Todd, supra note 5.
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embryos or no longer wishing to pursue procreation.9 This lapse of
time gives rise to litigation regarding the treatment and disposition
of pre-embryos.
Since IVF was introduced in the United States in 1981,10 there
have been a handful of cases responsible for developing precedent to
guide disputes over pre-embryos. These cases have attempted to
characterize the legal status of pre-embryos as persons, property, or
human tissue deserving “special respect.”11 The legal status determines the decision-making authority of the parties, IVF providers,
and courts over the pre-embryos, as well as the options for dispute
resolution.12 To resolve these pre-embryo disputes courts have adopted conflicting methods, including enforcing contracts, choosing not to
enforce prior agreements in favor of contemporaneous mutual
agreement, or balancing the parties’ respective interests.13 There is
no consensus among jurisdictions regarding a preferred standard;
thus, courts have been free to select from a patchwork of models in
order to resolve cases.
The discontinuity regarding the legal status of pre-embryos and
models for dispute resolution is further complicated by the risks that
accompany developing IVF technology.14 Accordingly, this is an area
9. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
10. Todd, supra note 5.
11. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); Skouvakis, supra note 8, at 887.
12. Upchurch, supra note 3, at 396.
13. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 776-79 (Iowa 2003) (describing the
three methods of analysis courts have suggested to resolve disputes over pre-embryos).
14. The practice of implanting numerous pre-embryos can lead to a higher rate of
multiple births, which may increase health risks for the mother and the baby. Todd, supra
note 5. According to the SART, as of 2012 the percentage of live births involving multiple
children in women under thirty-five years of age was 30.6%. Clinic Summary Report, supra
note 5. WebMD reports that 63% of live births are single babies, and 37% are twins, triplets, or more. Stöppler, supra note 2. Multiple births may result in a higher risk of miscarriage, anemia, hemorrhaging, and early labor, as well as the birth of weaker, underweight babies. Daily Mail Reporter, IVF Couples Told Mothers and Babies Put at
Risk from Multiple Embryo Implant, DAILYMAIL.COM (May 13, 2011, 7:03),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1386622/IVF-couples-warned-aiming-twins-putsmother-babies-risk.html.
Aside from risks associated with childbirth, the IVF procedure can be strenuous for
women. The process involves daily injections of hormones to stimulate production of multiple eggs, as well as frequent blood tests, and transvaginal ultrasounds. Stöppler, supra
note 2. After stimulation, the eggs are removed by insertion of a needle through the woman’s vagina into the ovary. Id. Three to five days later, the woman must undergo a procedure to transfer the fertilized pre-embryo to her uterus through the cervix with a catheter.
Id. After the transfer, the woman must continue to take hormone injections. Id. Moreover,
risks of the surgical procedure may include damage to organs, and injections may cause
ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS). Id.
Furthermore, this process is prohibitively expensive. According to the American Society
of Reproductive Medicine, the average cost of a cycle in the United States is $12,400. Todd,
supra note 5. The average cost of IVF treatment resulting in the live birth of a child is
$41,132. Georgina M. Chambers et al., The Economic Impact of Assisted Reproductive
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of law that warrants regulation. Government regulation of the legal
status of pre-embryos, the contracts between parties and IVF providers, and the extent to which IVF may be used by parties seeking
to procreate would promote continuity and respect for life. Couples
entering into this process would benefit from clarity concerning parental responsibilities and predictability regarding dispute resolution;15 and resulting pre-embryos would benefit from the opportunity
to develop.
Currently, Florida law has not settled on a legal status for preembryos or determined a model for resolving disputes between parties about frozen, stored pre-embryos. The divergent methods that
have been applied in different jurisdictions lead to unsatisfactory
resolutions and call for legislative action. This Note will present a
framework for Florida, or any state, to adopt regarding the treatment
of pre-embryos in IVF. Part II will summarize the relevant cases and
various methods courts have applied in order to resolve pre-embryo
disputes. Additionally, Part II will consider legislation enacted by
other states and countries. Part III will address the problems that
arise with the current treatment of pre-embryos in disputed cases.
Part IV will advocate for Florida to enact legislation that treats a
pre-embryo as a life16 that should be accorded personhood rights. Part
IV will also establish the authority of Florida to regulate in the area
of IVF and propose legislation that would provide a favorable framework to resolve disputes. Part V will establish that personhood for
pre-embryos would not infringe on individuals’ reproductive rights
and would not conflict with current precedent, while addressing likely objections to the proposed framework. Part VI will conclude that
Florida should recognize personhood for pre-embryos to facilitate dispute resolution and to respect life.
II. CURRENT TREATMENT OF PRE-EMBRYOS
Some courts, state legislatures, and foreign lawmakers have already addressed the treatment of pre-embryos in assisted reproduction disputes. Some courts have taken a position on what legal status
should be accorded to pre-embryos, while others have glossed over
any specific articulation of a legal status and simply considered the
progenitors’ rights. Some states and countries have enacted legislation to guide parties entering into IVF, while most others have not
Technology: A Review of Selected Developed Countries, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2281,
2291 (2009).
15. See Upchurch, supra note 3, at 397.
16. Throughout this Note, the pre-embryo may be referred to as “potential life” or a
“life.” Both terms refer to the pre-embryos at issue; however, while most courts denote the
pre-embryo as a “potential life,” I will refer to the pre-embryo as a “life” where my view
is expressed.
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legislated on the issue. There has not been a consensus regarding the
treatment of pre-embryos by the majority of courts and governments.
This Part will summarize the major cases that have dealt with preembryo disputes, the different frameworks courts have employed,
and laws of several states and foreign countries that govern the
treatment of pre-embryos.
A. First Impression for Treatment of Pre-Embryos
The first case to resolve a dispute over pre-embryos was York v.
Jones in 1989. In this case, a couple sought to have their frozen preembryos transferred from a medical college in Virginia to California,
and it was disputed whether the couple retained control of their preembryos.17 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
regarded the issue as a property dispute and resolved this case based
on the bailor-bailee relationship between the Yorks and the medical
college.18 The court considered that “[t]he essential nature of a bailment relationship imposes on the bailee, when the purpose of the
bailment has terminated, an absolute obligation to return the subject
matter of the bailment to the bailor,”19 which would require the medical college to release the pre-embryos to the Yorks. Thus, they were
able to transfer the pre-embryos to another institute for the purpose
of pursuing pregnancy.20
The court in York took for granted the status of the pre-embryo as
property, so the court did not present potential frameworks or analyze competing legal interests in the resolution of this dispute. This
case was also distinct from most pre-embryo cases, which involve
disputes between couples over disposition of the pre-embryos they
have jointly created. The first case to consider such a dispute and articulate a standard to provide guidance for future courts in resolving
pre-embryo disputes was Davis v. Davis in 1992.
Davis involved a dispute between Mary Sue Davis and Junior
Davis over the disposition of seven frozen pre-embryos following the
couple’s divorce.21 The couple had trouble bringing a child to term
and, after pursuing adoption without success, began the process of
IVF.22 Mary Sue underwent several unsuccessful IVF procedures to
transfer pre-embryos into her uterus.23 The couple then decided to
cryogenically preserve the pre-embryos but did not make an agree17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424 (E.D. Va. 1989).
Id. at 425.
Id. (citing 8 AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 178 (1980)).
Id.
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992).
Id. at 591.
Id.
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ment about storage or disposition of the frozen pre-embryos in the
event of “contingencies.”24 The lack of foresight about contingencies
was precisely the issue in this case. Following the couple’s divorce,
Mary Sue still wanted to implant the pre-embryos to bear children,
but Junior preferred to leave them frozen until he decided whether or
not he wished to become a parent.25
There was a dispute in the trial court regarding the semantics of
the pre-embryos at issue.26 Because this was a case of first impression, there was no guidance for the court in determining how the preembryos should be treated, or what terminology was appropriate.
“[S]emantical distinctions are significant in this context, because
language defines legal status and can limit legal rights.”27 Ultimately, the trial court held that “human life begins at the moment of conception” and invoked the doctrine of parens patriae to find for the
best interest of the child and award custody of the pre-embryos to
Mary Sue.28
The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that awarding
custody to Mary Sue would violate Junior’s constitutional right not to
procreate and that “there [was] no compelling state interest to justify
[ ] ordering implantation against the will of either party.”29 The appellate court remanded for the trial court to resolve this case under
the view that the parties had joint control over the disposition.30
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case to give more
guidance on this developing area of law. By this point, the parties’
views had changed; Mary Sue sought to donate the pre-embryos to
another couple, while Junior wanted to discard them.31 The court declared that there was no statute or common law precedent to guide
the decision and presented various models that medical-legal scholars and ethicists proposed regarding the treatment of pre-embryos:
Those models range from a rule requiring, at one extreme, that all
embryos be used by the gamete-providers or donated for uterine
transfer, and, at the other extreme, that any unused embryos be
automatically discarded. Other formulations would vest control in
the female gamete-provider—in every case, because of her greater
physical and emotional contribution to the IVF process, or perhaps
only in the event that she wishes to use them herself. There are
also two “implied contract” models: one would infer from enroll24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 592.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 592-93.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 589 (second alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 590.
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ment in an IVF program that the IVF clinic has authority to decide
in the event of an impasse whether to donate, discard, or use the
“frozen embryos” for research; the other would infer from the parties’ participation in the creation of the embryos that they had
made an irrevocable commitment to reproduction and would
require transfer either to the female provider or to a donee. There
are also the so-called “equity models”: one would avoid the conflict
altogether by dividing the “frozen embryos” equally between the
parties, to do with as they wish; the other would award veto power
to the party wishing to avoid parenthood, whether it be the female
or the male progenitor.32

The court conceded that each of these models would provide a
bright-line rule, but it declined to adopt any.33 The court then discussed the legal status of the pre-embryo, noting that the status dictates the decision-making authority of the parties, and the scope of
the decision-making authority is crucial to how courts will resolve
these cases.34 The court considered three ethical positions set out by
the American Fertility Society. The first view asserted that the preembryo is a human being at the time of fertilization and should be
accorded rights of a person.35 Under this view, all pre-embryos would
have the opportunity for implantation and development, and any action that would harm the pre-embryo would be prohibited.36 The second view asserted that the pre-embryo is nothing more than human
tissue and should not receive protection from any action.37 The third
view asserted that the pre-embryo deserves special respect because of
its potential for human life, while recognizing that the pre-embryo is
not yet a fully formed individual warranting the protection of personhood.38 The court rejected both extremes, refusing to recognize
personhood or give the pre-embryo a property status.39 Thus, the
court concluded that pre-embryos “occupy an interim category that
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human
life.”40 Based on this status, both Mary Sue and Junior had decisionmaking authority regarding the disposition of the pre-embryos.
The court then set up a framework for resolving pre-embryo disputes. First, the court would presume valid and enforce any agreement regarding disposition of pre-embryos in the event of contingen32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 590-91 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 597.
Id.
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cies such as death of either or both parties, divorce, changes in financial situation, or abandonment of IVF altogether.41 However, the parties would retain the ultimate decision-making authority and be able
to modify initial agreements with mutual consent.42 If the parties
could not agree on modification, the initial agreement would be enforced.43 If there was no prior agreement, the court would balance the
parties’ interests, weighing the interests of the parties in seeking
procreation or avoiding procreation.44 Under this balancing test,
courts would place greater weight on the rights of the party wishing
to avoid procreation so long as the other party had alternate means of
achieving parenthood.45
In this case, since there was no agreement concerning disposition,
and the parties were at an impasse, the court balanced Junior’s right
to avoid procreation and Mary Sue’s right to procreate.46 The court
held that the burden on Junior—of unwanted fatherhood or having
his pre-embryos develop into children and potentially grow up in a
single-parent home—was greater than the burden on Mary Sue—of
having undergone invasive IVF procedures and losing the opportunity to have her pre-embryos develop into children for another couple.47
B. Major Cases and Mixed Models
Since Davis, many courts have used the decision as a starting
point for their analyses in resolving pre-embryo disputes. However,
most cases have included prior agreements between the parties,
unlike Davis, and thus the courts have focused more on the enforceability of pre-embryo agreements. In cases involving such prior
agreements, courts have either enforced them or refused to enforce
them, often in favor of the party wishing to avoid procreation. Additionally, many courts have not characterized the legal status of the
pre-embryos, choosing to defer to the status set out by any IVF
agreement or declaring that the status does not have much of an
effect on the parties’ decision-making authority over the pre-embryos.
Moreover, courts have commonly weighed the parties’ respective
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 603. On a rare occasion, in Reber v. Reiss, this framework led to an outcome
in favor of the party seeking procreation. 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). In Reber, the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania granted the ex-wife possession of the pre-embryos. Id. at
1142. The court considered that she endured chemotherapy for breast cancer and that she
believed she was incapable of having children. Id. at 1132-34. Thus, the court concluded
that under the balancing test her right to procreate outweighed the ex-husband’s right to
avoid procreation. Id. at 1142.
46. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
47. Id. at 604.
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interests even where there was a prior agreement, contrary to
what Davis suggests. By doing so, the majority of courts have ruled
in favor of the party wishing to avoid procreation, regardless of the
model adopted.
1. Enforcing Prior Agreements
In Kass v. Kass, an issue arose before the New York Court of Appeals involving the disposition of five frozen pre-embryos of a divorced couple.48 Unlike in Davis, this couple had entered into a contract at the outset of the IVF process.49 The Kass couple agreed that
upon divorce or other contingency the pre-embryos would be donated
to the IVF program for research purposes.50 The agreement specified
that legal ownership of the pre-embryos was to be determined in a
property settlement in the event of a dispute.51 When the couple divorced, the ex-wife wished to have the pre-embryos implanted to
achieve pregnancy,52 while the ex-husband sought specific performance of the agreement.53 The court expressed that it had no cause to
decide whether the pre-embryos deserved special respect, as the Davis court did, because the parties’ authority over the pre-embryos was
established by the agreement.54 Following the Davis framework as
applied to contract enforcement, the court held that the agreement
signed by the parties plainly reflected their joint intention to donate
the pre-embryos to the IVF program and should be enforced.55
Similarly, in Roman v. Roman, the Texas Court of Appeals applied
the Davis framework to enforce a prior agreement between a couple
which provided for the pre-embryos to be discarded in the event of
divorce.56 The court did not independently analyze the status of the
pre-embryos but accepted the status conferred by the contract that
identified them as the joint property of the couple.57 The court reasoned that written embryo agreements are valid and enforceable so
long as the parties have the opportunity to withdraw consent to the
terms of the agreement.58

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 175.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 175.
193 S.W.3d 40, 54-55 (Tex. App. 2006).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 48.
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In Litowitz v. Litowitz, the parties were required to petition the
court for instructions about the disposition of the pre-embryos when
they could not reach an agreement.59 The Supreme Court of Washington enforced the cryopreservation contract providing that the preembryos be thawed out and not allowed to develop.60 In this case, the
court enforced the contract over the objection of both parties, who
each sought procreation; the ex-husband wished to donate the preembryos to an adoptive couple, and the ex-wife sought to implant
them in a surrogate.61
Finally, in Szafranski v. Dunston, the Illinois Court of Appeals
considered the various approaches available for a dispute over preembryos between a girlfriend and boyfriend.62 The court held that the
best approach was to honor the parties’ own mutually expressed
intent in a prior agreement as valid and binding.63 The court stated
that, had it decided to balance the parties’ interests, the outcome
would have been in favor of the girlfriend because she had no alternate means of conceiving a child due to chemotherapy.64 It dually
noted that, had it adopted the contemporaneous mutual consent
approach, the case would have come out in favor of the boyfriend
because he would have withheld consent to implantation of the preembryos.65 Thus, Szafranski is another rare case in which the party
seeking to procreate prevailed.66
2. Refusing to Enforce Agreements
In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
declined to enforce a consent form wherein a couple mutually agreed
that the remaining frozen pre-embryos should be returned to the exwife for implantation in the event of separation.67 The court considered that Davis and Kass presumed prior agreements to be valid and
enforceable, but it reasoned that the consent form did not express the
mutual intention of the parties regarding disposition and thus was
not an enforceable contract.68 Moreover, the court declared that even
if the couple entered into an unambiguous pre-embryo agreement, it
would not enforce the contract against the will of either party for
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

48 P.3d 261, 264 (Wash. 2002).
Id. at 268.
Id. at 264.
993 N.E.2d 502, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
Id.
See id. at 505-06, 514.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 504.
725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054, 1059 (Mass. 2000).
Id. at 1055-56.
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public policy reasons.69 The court did not consider the legal status of
the pre-embryo but rested the decision on the parties’ rights to enter
into familial relationships.70
Similarly, in J.B. v. M.B., the Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to enforce both an oral agreement between the parties regarding disposition of pre-embryos, as well as the consent form signed by
the parties.71 The ex-husband claimed that the parties discussed and
agreed that the pre-embryos would be utilized by them or another
infertile couple, consistent with his religious views; however, the exwife denied that such an agreement existed.72 The court ruled in her
favor based on her interest to avoid procreation and held that a “formal, unambiguous memorialization of the parties’ intentions would
be required to confirm their joint determination.”73 The consent form
relinquished the pre-embryos to the IVF program if dissolution of
marriage occurred, but the form was found to be too ambiguous to
manifest mutual intent about disposition.74 The court declared that
agreements entered into at the commencement of IVF should be
enforced, subject to either party changing his or her mind about disposition, and if there is disagreement about disposition, the interests
of both parties must be evaluated.75
Finally, in In re Marriage of Witten, the Supreme Court of Iowa
considered whether the parties’ agreement was enforceable where
one party changed his or her mind.76 Initially, the court analyzed
whether pre-embryos had the legal status of children for purposes
of applying a best interest of the child standard.77 The court held that
the standard did not fit this case because the issue was not the
custody of children, but rather who had decision-making authority
over the pre-embryos.78 This court, like in J.B., held that it would
be a violation of public policy to enforce an agreement regarding
disposition of pre-embryos when a party changed his or her mind.79
Furthermore, public policy concerns about imposing unwanted
69. Id. at 1058.
70. Id. at 1059.
71. 783 A.2d 707, 714, 719-20 (N.J. 2001).
72. Id. at 710.
73. Id. at 714.
74. Id. at 713.
75. Id. at 719.
76. 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003).
77. Id. at 775.
78. Id. at 776 (noting that Davis held that pre-embryos were neither “persons” nor
“property” for purposes of determining the parties’ decision-making authority about
disposition).
79. Id. at 781. “Only when one person makes known the agreement no longer reflects
his or her current values or wishes is public policy implicated.” Id. at 783.
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parenthood would be implicated by the application of the balancing
approach, which left this emotional, personal decision up to courts.80
In support of the contemporaneous mutual consent approach, the
court asked, “[A]t what time does the partners’ consent matter?”81 It
reasoned that under this approach, the parties’ current views should
replace original agreements because compelled parenthood imposes
an unwanted identity on a person—forcing them to redefine their
lives, their place in the world, and their legacy82—while acknowledging that “mandatory destruction of an embryo can have equally profound consequences, particularly for those who believe that embryos
are persons . . . [as] loss of a child . . . can lead to life-altering feelings
of mourning, guilt, and regret.”83 Accordingly, the court concluded
that when couples cannot reach a contemporaneous mutual agreement, the pre-embryos are to remain frozen.84
C. State Legislation Concerning IVF
Various jurisdictions have adopted different frameworks for deciding pre-embryo disputes. Most IVF treatments occur at private clinics that usually require a couple seeking IVF to indicate their decision regarding disposition on the clinic’s informed consent form.85
However, the cases summarized above demonstrate how states differ
on the enforcement of such agreements. While many state courts
have addressed the issue, there has been relatively little state legislation in this area. Some states have enacted legislation addressing
IVF, but none has answered the question of custody of the preembryos in the event that a couple divorces or cannot reach an
agreement on disposition.86
Florida has enacted legislation requiring that a commissioning
couple enter into an agreement concerning disposition prior to IVF
treatment. Section 742.17, Florida Statutes, regarding disposition of
eggs, sperm, or pre-embryos, provides:
A commissioning couple and the treating physician shall enter into
a written agreement that provides for the disposition of the

80. Id. at 779.
81. Id. at 777 (citing Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55,
91 (1999)).
82. Id. at 778 (citing Coleman, supra note 81, at 96-97).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Coleman, supra note 81, at 110-12).
85. Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One’s Mind, 12
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 81 (2002).
86. Id. at 82.
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commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm, and preembryos in the event
of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen
circumstance.
(1) Absent a written agreement, any remaining eggs or sperm
shall remain under the control of the party that provides the eggs
or sperm.
(2) Absent a written agreement, decisionmaking authority regarding the disposition of preembryos shall reside jointly with the
commissioning couple.
(3) Absent a written agreement, in the case of the death of
one member of the commissioning couple, any eggs, sperm, or
preembryos shall remain under the control of the surviving member of the commissioning couple.87

While providing that the pre-embryos remain under the control of
the parties and that the parties have joint decision-making authority,
this statute does not recognize a status for pre-embryos. Furthermore, this statute leaves unclear how a case would be resolved if a
couple failed to reach an agreement about disposition, and it does not
identify the binding nature of the agreement between the parties.88
New Hampshire has enacted legislation regulating gestational
surrogacy so that a gestational surrogate does not have any rights to
the child and must agree to carry the child to term.89 New Hampshire
legislation identifies contingencies, such as divorce, only to say that a
change of marital status would not have any effect on an agreement
with a gestational surrogate.90
Louisiana is the only state that has enacted strict regulations regarding the status of pre-embryos, recognizing them as juridical persons91 with certain rights granted by law.92 Because a pre-embryo is
considered to be a person under Louisiana law, the State prohibits
intentional destruction of a pre-embryo by a natural person, physician, or clinic after the pre-embryo has been allowed to develop for a
short period wherein the cells begin to divide.93 Furthermore, Louisiana provides that IVF patients seeking treatment owe pre-embryos a
high duty of care, and if they no longer wish to become parents at
some point prior to implantation, the pre-embryos should be donated
87. FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2015).
88. Shapo, supra note 85, at 82.
89. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (2014).
90. Id. (“The marriage or partnership of a gestational carrier after she executes a
gestational carrier agreement does not affect the validity or the terms of the gestational
carrier agreement, and her spouse or partner shall not be a parent of the resulting child.”).
91. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2015).
92. § 9:121.
93. See § 9:129.
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to another couple for implantation and adoption.94 Finally, Louisiana
lawmakers anticipated disputes over custody of pre-embryos and enacted legislation requiring courts to resolve cases in the best interest
of the “in vitro fertilized ovum,”95 a byproduct of the best interest of
the child standard.
D. European Laws Governing IVF
Many countries in Europe have regulated IVF to various degrees;
the United Kingdom, for example, provides loose regulation, while
other countries criminalize acts that are common in the practice
of IVF. In the United Kingdom, the primary concern with regard to
IVF regulation is consent by the parties.96 The Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act of 2008 (HFEA) does not prohibit any form of
destruction or impose any marital status restriction on commissioning couples.97 Furthermore, HFEA provides that frozen pre-embryos
will be discarded ten years after their creation, unless both parties
consent to continued storage.98
France prohibits the creation of pre-embryos for research purposes
and imposes strict regulations on the use of pre-embryos for research.99 Additionally, France prohibits surrogacy100 and limits IVF
access to married or committed heterosexual couples for infertility
treatment.101 The Bioethics Law of 2004 is one of several laws regulating IVF in France.102 It sets out the values of “(i) respect for the
dignity of the human embryo; (ii) respect for all stages of life; and (iii)
respect for human rights.”103 However, this law does not include
specific provisions about the destruction of pre-embryos created for
IVF purposes.104
The German Act on the Protection of Embryos, among other
things, prohibits fertilizing more than three eggs in one cycle, trans94. § 9:130.
95. § 9:131.
96. See Shapo, supra note 85, at 98; Memorandum from White & Case LLP to the
Center for Reproductive Rights 31 (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.federa.org.pl/
dokumenty_pdf/invitro/jbf_European_laws_governing_in_vitro_fertilization%5B2%5D.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum].
97. Memorandum, supra note 96, at 33-34.
98. Id. at 34.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id. at 8. IVF is only available if a couple is infertile, if there is a risk of transmitting a disease through natural reproduction, or if a party anticipates medical procedures
would affect fertility. Id.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id. (footnote omitted).
104. Id. at 8.
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ferring more than three pre-embryos to a woman’s uterus per cycle,
and fertilizing more eggs than are planned to be implanted in one
cycle.105 German law prohibits creating a pre-embryo for any reason
other than to cause pregnancy and restricts IVF methods to married
couples.106 Furthermore, German law generally does not allow for
cryopreservation of pre-embryos; however, in limited cases where
surplus pre-embryos are stored, German courts have not decided
whether destruction of pre-embryos is prohibited by the Act.107 Punishment for violating restrictions ranges from monetary fines to three
years in prison.108
Italian law is similar to German law in many respects. Italy limits
the number of pre-embryos that can be created to three, requiring
contemporaneous implantation, which may reduce the likelihood
of conception per cycle.109 Additionally, Italy limits IVF access to
“stable” heterosexual couples.110 Furthermore, it prohibits cryogenic
preservation, except in limited cases where transfer is delayed
because of health reasons.111 In such cases, the law provides that
implantation should occur as soon as possible and imposes monetary
fines or prison sentences for the violation of any provision.112 Italy
also grants rights to the pre-embryos as conceived persons.113
France, Germany, and Italy provide more stringent regulation to
promote respect for life at all stages, protect the intentions of the
parties entering into IVF, and prevent people from utilizing the
process for reasons other than procreation. The laws ensure that the
results of IVF procedures match the parties’ intentions when seeking
treatment. When there is no regulation to support such values,
problems may arise that are harmful to pre-embryos and individuals
engaging in IVF.
III. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT TREATMENT OF PRE-EMBRYOS
Currently, the law does not offer one answer as to how courts
should treat pre-embryos, but many. Yet the very nature of IVF
makes the need for more meaningful regulation apparent. IVF procedures produce many more pre-embryos than a couple intends to use
105. Id. at 11; see Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2008).
106. See Memorandum, supra note 96, at 12, 18.
107. Id. at 18.
108. Id. at 12.
109. Id. at 22-23.
110. Id. at 23; see Rao, supra note 105, at 1458-59.
111. Memorandum, supra note 96, at 22-23.
112. Id. at 23-24.
113. See id. at 22.
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for immediate implantation, and excess pre-embryos may be stored
for an indeterminate amount of time.114 The preservation of preembryos carries the practice of IVF into unknown future circumstances, allowing time for parties to change their minds, opinions,
and desires.115 Regardless of whether couples create agreements that
anticipate future disposition, the availability of indefinite storage can
lead to heated litigation when commissioning couples disagree about
the disposition of the pre-embryos they have created.116
The current models for resolution of pre-embryo disputes lead to
harmful outcomes for various parties involved because litigation
transfers the decision to have a child to the court. Judicial interference is particularly damaging given the deeply moral and personal
questions at stake in pre-embryo disputes, including individual
interests in procreating and differing beliefs about when human life
begins.117 Worse, courts have not adopted a national, uniform standard for resolving disputes or for understanding the legal status
of pre-embryos; therefore, people entering into IVF cannot have clear
expectations regarding their interest in the pre-embryos and the
result of possible disputes. The trend is for courts to adopt whichever
model will avoid procreation, so one or both parties are nearly always
deprived of the right to procreate, and the pre-embryos themselves
are nearly always deprived of the right to life.
A. Lack of Uniformity of Model
Inevitably, pre-embryo disputes involve many moving parts:
deeply emotional and personal decisions that will affect the parties’
futures, state interests in potential life, rapidly advancing technologies, and ethical considerations.118 Such factors make it difficult
for courts to resolve these disputes and lead to the inconsistent
application of available models to resolve cases. The line of cases
dealing with pre-embryo disputes has established a set of models
including the contractual approach, contemporaneous mutual consent, and balancing of interests. As Szafranski indicates, the outcome
of pre-embryo disputes rests almost entirely on the approach the
114. See Tamar Lewin, Industry’s Growth Leads to Leftover Embryos, and Painful
Choices, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/embryos-eggdonors-difficult-issues.html?emc=eta1 (“The embryos with the greatest chance of developing into a healthy baby are used first, and the excess are frozen; a 2002 survey found about
400,000 frozen embryos, and another in 2011 estimated 612,000. Now, many reproductive
endocrinologists say, the total may be about a million.”).
115. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
116. See id.
117. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003); Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992).
118. See id. at 591.
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court adopts, and courts are at liberty to choose which outcomedeterminative approach to apply.119 The variety of approaches and
divergent positions taken by different jurisdictions leaves little guidance for courts facing similar cases in the future.
The lack of uniformity and clarity limits predictability in the
resolution of disputes. Yet predictability is often necessary to allow
couples and IVF providers the opportunity to plan for future
disposition, calculate potential liability, and anticipate the outcome
of disputes.120 When courts may choose whether to enforce prior
agreements or to determine the parties’ intentions and balance interests, parties remain uncertain about which model a court will apply
in the event of a dispute. This uncertainty may cause people to be
more hesitant about entering into pre-embryo agreements or to have
less confidence that their interests will be protected later because
courts have a tendency to employ whichever approach leads to avoiding procreation, regardless of whether it is consistent with either or
both of the parties’ interests. For example, the court in Kass deemed
it appropriate to enforce a prior agreement favoring donation of the
pre-embryos for research;121 the court in A.Z. refused to enforce the
prior agreement without both parties’ subsequent consent, favoring
non-use of the pre-embryos;122 and the court in Litowitz chose to enforce a prior agreement to discard the pre-embryos, even when both
parties desired that the pre-embryos be implanted and develop.123
The potential threat to parties’ right to procreate is also evident in
the balancing of interests model. For example, Davis makes conclusions about the burdens that would be endured by each party if the
right they were seeking to exercise was infringed, while maintaining
that “the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of
equal significance—the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.”124 The court sympathized with Junior Davis’s plight of not
wanting to be a genetic father, even though its rationale for according
more weight to Junior’s rights than Mary Sue’s was tenuous considering the intense IVF procedures that Mary Sue underwent.125 The
119. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
120. See id. at 515 (citing the recommendation by the American Medical Association
that parties enter into prior agreements about the disposition of pre-embryos in the event
of changes in circumstances, which would require parties to consider their desires and
contemplate the consequences of the IVF process).
121. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
122. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
123. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
124. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992).
125. Id. at 591. “We are not unmindful of the fact that the trauma (including both emotional stress and physical discomfort) to which women are subjected in the IVF process is
more severe than is the impact of the procedure on men.” Id. at 601. For Mary Sue, this
process included numerous injections in spite of her fear of needles, aspiration procedures
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court stated, “While this is not an insubstantial emotional burden, we
can only conclude that Mary Sue Davis’s interest in donation is not
as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding
parenthood.”126 The court did not consider any personal reasons that
Mary Sue might have had for desiring not to destroy the preembryos. Moreover, the court assumed that Mary Sue should be
equally as comfortable with adoption after she was able to create preembryos of her own as she was before she was given the unique
opportunity to exercise her procreative freedom.127 This case illustrates a clear risk that courts might arbitrarily balance interests to
align with the more sympathetic party and decline to protect equivalent constitutional rights equally.
Employing a uniform approach to resolve disputes would protect
parties’ mutual interests, guarantee predictability of outcomes, preserve parties’ fundamental rights, and prompt more careful consideration in contracting before entering into IVF.
B. Lack of Uniformity of Status
In addition to a lack of uniformity among courts’ selection and
application of dispute resolution models, there is no consensus regarding the legal status of pre-embryos. Even though Davis asserted
that granting pre-embryos special respect was the most widely held
view and the most appropriate view to adopt,128 this view has not
been uniformly applied. Many courts do not analyze the independent
status of the pre-embryo, while others operate as if it is property or
a person. When the legal status of the pre-embryo is not uniformly
defined, parties and providers are uncertain about which rights are
implicated and which interests attach at the time a pre-embryo
is created. This may lead to injury when parties feel that their expectations are hindered or their rights are violated. To avoid such
problems, there should be a uniform legal status for pre-embryos;
however, there are disadvantages to characterizing pre-embryos as
property or giving them special respect.
Under a property view, the potential for life of the pre-embryo is
not considered, nor are the constitutional interests of the commissioning couple in that life.129 When pre-embryos are considered
property, essentially all that matters to resolve disputes is contract
interpretation, enforceability of contracts, and marital property
to retrieve her eggs, procedures to transfer the pre-embryos to her uterus, and the trauma
of receiving negative pregnancy tests after undergoing this procedure. Id. at 591-92.
126. See id. at 604.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 596-97.
129. See Upchurch, supra note 3, at 401.
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law.130 These models could be very complicated because enforcement
of a contract between parties could implicate procreation, even without explicit recognition of the potential for life. Moreover, while marital property law might ease dispute resolution by dividing the preembryos equally between both parties, it could equally violate one or
more parties’ interests because a party could choose to utilize or
destroy a pre-embryo, exercising a procreative liberty without consent. Under a property view, parties would not be able to make an
argument about infringement of their procreative freedom or about
the potential for life.131 Furthermore, if pre-embryos are viewed as
any other human tissue, it is impossible to limit the actions that can
be taken, including methods of destruction, research, and experimentation,132 thereby devaluing the life at issue.
Davis asserted that this potential for life converts the nature of
the pre-embryo to a hybrid characterization as human tissue that
should be accorded special respect.133 This status aims to promote
greater respect for the pre-embryo than for other human tissue
because of its “potential to become a person and because of its symbolic meaning for many people.”134 It does not, however, accomplish
this purpose in any practical manner because the status does not
have the effect of granting any more respect to the pre-embryo. The
resolution of most cases, even when this status is assumed, is still
that the pre-embryo is destroyed. Reber and Szafranksi are the only
cases to accord more respect to pre-embryos; yet the results in those
cases had little to do with respect for the pre-embryos. In Reber and
Szafranksi, the courts balanced the parties’ interests in favor of the
women seeking to procreate because they did not have alternate
means of exercising their procreative rights.135
Under Davis, the recognition of special respect was a means of establishing the parties’ fundamental privacy and procreative rights in
relation to the pre-embryo, while leaving the status of the pre-embryo
essentially the same. The special respect status triggers procreation
interests, allowing parties to contract around disposition. It grants
couples “an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that
they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the
preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law,” which is distinct
from a true property interest.136 Yet, in applying the special respect
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
133. Id. at 597.
134. Id. at 596.
135. Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d
1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
136. Upchurch, supra note 3, at 404 (quoting Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597).
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status and the interests vested by it, pre-embryos have actually been
treated “more as property than as a person.”137
As evidenced by the cases employing property or special respect
statuses, “courts have been unable to articulate a status for the
embryo that provides for a workable solution to the dispute while
simultaneously preserving respect for the unique attributes of the
embryo.”138 For this reason, granting pre-embryos the legal status
of persons might be the best approach to create a uniform status
and establish an effective model for dispute resolution. Under the
personhood approach, the party seeking procreation would nearly
always receive custody of the pre-embryo,139 and the pre-embryo
would be accorded legal rights.
IV. RESOLUTION
To solve the problems that arise in pre-embryo disputes, Florida
should enact legislation to establish that a pre-embryo has the legal
status of a person. This legal status would grant pre-embryos constitutional protections, alter the decision-making authority of commissioning couples, require regulation of IVF providers, and provide
better guidance for courts in resolving disputes. Additionally, this
status would solve the problems with pre-embryo disputes by providing predictability to the parties involved and helping them anticipate
future responsibilities and potential liabilities before entering into
IVF.
A. State’s Authority to Regulate
The starting point of this analysis is where the State derives its
power to regulate in the area of assisted reproductive technology, and
IVF more specifically. Before this question can be answered, the right
to use IVF must be located within U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
1. State May Regulate Due Process and Equal Protection Rights
Many scholars assume that the right to use IVF flows from the
fundamental right to procreate.140 The Supreme Court articulated the
fundamental right to procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma141 and placed
that right within the privacy interest of an individual in Eisenstadt v.
137. Id. at 405.
138. Id. at 397.
139. See id. at 402 (explaining that for a court to find for the party who does not wish to
implant the embryo, “the court would have to find that being given the possibility to develop into a fetus and eventually be born as a human being would not be in the best interest of
the embryo”).
140. Rao, supra note 105, at 1459.
141. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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Baird.142 In Eisenstadt the Court stated, “If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.”143 This precedent establishes that the government
may intrude on the right to privacy by regulating IVF when it is
warranted. Additionally, Eisenstadt may support the proposition that
the right to use IVF does not fall within the scope of privacy rights.
The right to privacy prohibits intrusion; thus government regulation
intended to prevent access to certain technologies, without delving
into personal matters, would not necessarily infringe on privacy.144
Under the view that there is no constitutional right to procreate
using IVF, “the government [is] completely free to regulate the field
of fertility treatments.”145 Radhika Rao has proposed the idea that
there is no general right to utilize IVF, but any restriction must be
equally applied to confer an equal right, in the absence of an absolute
right.146 Therefore, “a law banning or limiting [IVF] would not necessarily infringe the constitutional guarantee of equality.”147
2. State Has Compelling Interest at Viability
If individuals have no constitutional right to use IVF, the State
remains free to regulate and protect pre-embryos. However, even
assuming that there is a fundamental right to procreate using IVF,
the State may still have room to regulate. The relevant line of cases
wherefrom a state derives the power to regulate IVF begins with Roe
v. Wade.148 In Roe, the Supreme Court established that a fetus is not
a constitutional person and should not be granted independent rights
and protections as a person.149 Roe established a woman’s right to
choose to have an abortion as falling under her fundamental right to
privacy.150 In addition, Roe established that the State can regulate to
advance its interest in potential life at viability.151
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
Id.
Rao, supra note 105, at 1465.
Id. at 1459.
Id. at 1460.
Id. at 1467.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 158, 161-62.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 163-64.
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life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of
fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period,
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother.152

Florida similarly recognizes that the constitutional right to privacy protects a woman’s right to choose an abortion;153 but a compelling
interest in protecting potential life attaches at the point of viability
of the fetus.154 Therefore, “[l]egislation that infringes on the right to
privacy will be invalidated unless it can survive the compelling state
interest test.”155
Davis applied the privacy rights accorded by Roe—and correspondingly by Florida—to the IVF context. Davis declared that there
is no constitutional basis for considering the pre-embryo as a person
because the “Supreme Court explicitly refused to hold that the fetus
possesses independent rights under law.”156 However, the court noted
that Roe and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services confirm a
compelling state interest in potential life at the point of viability157—
when the fetus is capable of meaningful life outside the mother’s
womb.158 Notably, the point of viability in abortion cases is distinct
from viability in the IVF context. In IVF, a pre-embryo is inherently
capable of meaningful life outside its mother’s womb because it is
created outside the mother’s womb and has the potential to fully
develop outside of the mother’s womb if implanted in another
woman’s body. The argument for viability in IVF, then, is different
than the understanding in the Roe line of cases, where viability was

152. Id.
153. Renee B. v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 790 So. 2d 1036, 1041
(Fla. 2001).
154. See Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“The state’s interest
in the potentiality of life of an unborn fetus becomes compelling,” so as to potentially overcome the mother’s constitutional right to refuse medical intervention, “ ‘at the point in time
when the fetus becomes viable,’ defined as ‘the time at which the fetus becomes capable of
meaningful life outside the womb, albeit with artificial aid.’ ” (quoting In re T.W., 551 So.
2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989))); see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192-93 (holding that the
State’s interest in maternal health becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester so
as to overcome women’s privacy interests in abortion).
155. Thomas v. Smith, 882 So. 2d 1037, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Von Eiff v.
Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998) (“When analyzing a statute that infringes on the
fundamental right of privacy, the applicable standard of review requires that the statute
survive the highest level of scrutiny,” under which the State bears the burden of “demonstrating that the challenged regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes
its goal through the use of the least intrusive means.”).
156. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992).
157. Id.
158. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
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inextricably linked to the biological mother’s body. This difference
provides a basis for the State to regulate as of the time a pre-embryo
is created.
The decision in Roe rested heavily on infringement of a woman’s
bodily integrity and the burdens of unwanted motherhood.159 In
the same vein, Roe’s progeny considered how the development of
a life would affect the mother and possibly infringe on her reproductive freedom and bodily integrity. However, IVF presents concerns
distinct from the bodily integrity argument in Roe and the cases
that followed.160 With IVF, the mother’s bodily integrity is not necessarily implicated by the process after the pre-embryo has been
created. A woman may decide not to go through with implantation
and donate the pre-embryo to a third party, relinquishing any
undesired parental status by allowing for adoption. Therefore, the
State’s compelling interest in the potential life of pre-embryos
attaches at the time of fertilization in the laboratory, which signals
their viability.
3. Pre-Embryo Protection Is Consistent with Other Fetal
Protections
Recognizing that the State has a compelling interest in protecting
a pre-embryo as of the time of fertilization is consistent with Florida’s
recognition of greater fetal protections in other areas of the law.
For example, Florida grants protection in its fetal homicide laws,
providing that the “unlawful killing of an unborn child . . . shall be
deemed murder.”161 Section 1.01(3), Florida Statutes, provides: “The
word ‘person’ includes individuals, children, firms, associations, joint
adventures, partnerships, estates, trusts, business trusts, syndicates,
fiduciaries, corporations, and all other groups or combinations.”162
The use of the term “children” in the murder statute connotes a status of personhood that extends to fetuses in this context; the statute
makes no indication that the term is intended to apply only to fetuses
after the point of gestational viability.163 Therefore, Florida’s fetal
homicide law recognizes that the State has a compelling interest in
potential life, which gives the State authority to regulate before the
point of gestational viability.

159. See id. at 153.
160. See Rao, supra note 105, at 1467-68.
161. FLA. STAT. § 782.09(1) (2015).
162. § 1.01(3) (emphasis added).
163. Gestational viability refers to the viability of a fetus in the mother’s womb. This is
a distinct concept from viability of a pre-embryo, which I argue, begins at fertilization because of the pre-embryo’s potential for full development outside of the biological
mother’s womb.

338

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:315

Florida identifies varying degrees of protection for potential life,
which allows it to assert personhood in the context of fetal homicide
laws without compromising abortion rights. Similarly, the court in
Davis recognized that potential life may receive varying degrees of
protection. The court noted that while a viable fetus is not accorded
protection against wrongful death, it is awarded some protection in
the abortion context unless the mother’s life is at risk and greater
protection in a criminal context involving attack or homicide.164 It is
clear from such protections that Florida has an important interest in
protecting human life, which becomes a compelling interest in certain
contexts, like fetal homicide laws, and should become compelling in
the IVF context. The State’s interest in fetal personhood in criminal
laws creates room to carve out pre-embryo personhood that does not
contradict the State’s position on abortion.
The State has authority to regulate IVF, even under various
understandings of the right to procreate. Under the position that
there is no fundamental right to assisted reproduction and that IVF
does not constitute government intrusion into a person’s body,
the State may regulate IVF freely. Under the notion that there is a
fundamental right to procreate using IVF, the State’s interest must
be compelling in order to justify infringement. The reason the State’s
interest is compelling in IVF is because of the nuanced understanding of viability in this context, which occurs at the time of fertilization in the laboratory. From this point, the State may regulate IVF in
the interest of protecting human life.
B. Legislative Proposal and Implications
Florida should utilize its authority to regulate in the field of
IVF and create a law that grants pre-embryos the legal status of
persons, similar to the Louisiana statute that identifies pre-embryos
as human beings.165 This law would complement Florida’s current
legislation mandating that couples enter into an agreement with the
physician prior to commencing IVF treatment;166 however, it would
alter this agreement in several respects. First, all agreements would
have a clause recognizing the status of pre-embryos as persons and
explicitly implicating the right to procreate.167 Second, agreements
would mimic the laws of Germany and Italy, providing that a maxi164. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594-95 (Tenn. 1992).
165. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2015) (defining “human embryo”).
166. See FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2015); see also discussion supra Section II.C.
167. There is discord among courts as to when the right to procreate is implicated. One
view acknowledges that the right to procreate attaches at the point when the parties agree
to fertilize the egg and create the pre-embryo; the opposing view sees the right to procreate
as an ongoing choice initially implicated by the creation of the pre-embryo. Upchurch, supra note 3, at 408-09.

2015]

PERSONHOOD FOR PRE-EMBRYOS

339

mum of three pre-embryos be fertilized at one time and requiring
implantation of all fertilized pre-embryos at the same time. Third,
the agreement would preclude the destruction of pre-embryos and
only allow cryogenic preservation in exceptional circumstances.
Finally, since section 742.17, Florida Statutes, does not provide guidance as to the enforceability of this agreement between parties, new
legislation would ensure enforcement of prior agreements between
the parties.
The American Medical Association (AMA) recommends that
parties engage in serious discussions and consider all consequences
before undergoing IVF.168 Heeding this caution, couples commencing
IVF treatment should regard this process very seriously and only
enter into it with full willingness to become a parent. The clause
identifying the pre-embryos as persons would cause the right to procreate to attach at the point that the parties agree to create any preembryos. The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society
suggests that “[a] person’s liberty to procreate or to avoid procreation
is directly involved in most decisions involving pre-embryos.”169 The
agreement between the parties and with the physician is the first
decision involving pre-embryos. The action of providing genetic material pursuant to this agreement, with the intention that childbirth
will result, is a direct exercise of an individual’s procreative liberty.
Beyond this point, there should be no question of the donor’s liberty
to exercise their procreative rights because of the manifest intent
to procreate with knowledge that the procedures will likely result in
conception and the birth of a child. This intent and knowledge would
be sufficient to establish parental rights at the time the parties
enter into the agreement. To this effect, proceeding with treatment
would seriously limit the possible outcomes for a couple that later
changes their mind regarding disposition. Because parties can waive
constitutional rights via contract,170 entering into the IVF agreement
would preclude parties from later asserting a right not to procreate
with regard to the disposition of any pre-embryos they created.
The limitation on the number of pre-embryos produced, the requirement of implantation, and the prohibition of cryogenic preservation would significantly speed up the IVF process. It would render
IVF off limits to couples seeking to preserve pre-embryos for potential future use and postponement of reproduction, except in cases
where imminent physical conditions would render someone infertile,
as in Reber and Szafranski.171 These regulations would close the
168.
169.
170.
171.

See Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 516.
Id. at 515; Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
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window for couples’ circumstances, values, and desires to change
regarding the outcome of the IVF process and future disposition of
pre-embryos. Inevitably, disputes would arise in some cases, which
would lead courts to enforce contracts. The limitations on the creation and preservation of pre-embryos in this proposed legislation
would require that disposition be limited to implantation by the
commissioning couple or donation to an adoptive couple. Courts
would be able to enforce contracts that satisfy either option chosen by
the couple without balancing the interests and without contemporaneous mutual consent.
The AMA and courts have encouraged parties to make agreements
about the disposition of frozen pre-embryos in the event of contingencies.172 Florida law establishes this as a requirement.173 A contractual
approach is beneficial both at the outset of the IVF process to memorialize the agreed intentions of the parties and at the dispute resolution phase to remove the court from making personal decisions for
the parties.174 Furthermore, it gives couples and IVF providers the
certainty lacking in current dispute resolution models.
To answer the court’s question in Witten,175 under this legislation,
the parties’ mutual agreement at the time of contracting for IVF
would be given greater deference than contemporaneous mutual
consent—which, if achieved, would rarely give rise to litigation in the
first place. Weighing consent at the time that parties agree to use
IVF and contribute their genetic material for fertilization would provide the advantages of: 1) binding the parties to previous obligations
despite changes in priorities or values; 2) guaranteeing that the
outcome represents a meeting of the minds between the parties176—
possibly the only agreement between the parties throughout the
course of the process and subsequent dispute; and 3) ensuring that
this personal decision is one made by the parties, not a far-removed
court.
This framework would lead to different outcomes than the
current trend, not solely because of the certainty that prior agreements would be enforced, but because of additional considerations
in a balancing of interests approach. Following Davis, courts have
found a way to nearly always side with the party avoiding procreation. The interests, however, would look different under this proposed
legislation because the right to procreate would already be exercised,
172. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506, 515.
173. FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2015).
174. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506.
175. “[A]t what time does the partners’ consent matter?” In re Marriage of Witten, 672
N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003).
176. Although, there has been concern over coercion and potential undue influence
because of the close relation of the parties.
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and the State would have an interest in protecting pre-embryos.
Additionally, a pre-embryo’s right to life may arise in the analysis if
the court decided to balance all the parties’ interests or if the court
employed the best interest of the child standard.177
One additional consideration regarding contract enforcement is
that contracts should be enforced unless they violate public policy.178
The court in Witten considered whether public policy favored the
position that a party who agrees to enter into IVF may not later
change his or her mind to become a parent.179 The court pointed out
that there was no state statute on point, but the “morals of the
times”—based on precedent of other state courts that considered the
issue—weighed in favor of the party avoiding procreation.180 The
court, therefore, determined that there was no public policy to favor
using the pre-embryos over either party’s objection.181
Conversely, in Florida, there is an existing statute requiring
couples to enter into an agreement prior to commencing IVF. This
mandatory contracting furthers public policy and promotes established societal interests. In addition, there is no federal or Florida
precedent that would be violated by recognition of personhood
for pre-embryos or regulation of IVF. Florida’s compelling interest
in protecting human life at the point of viability supports the
proposition that the “morals of the times” call for legislation that
promotes life. In regard to the proposed framework, public policy
supports enforcing agreements and maintaining the legal status of
pre-embryos as persons.
V. DEFENDING THE PROPOSITION
There are several notable objections to address in defense of this
proposal. Initially, critics might point out that recognition of personhood of a pre-embryo violates long-standing precedent established
with Roe and subsequent cases. As Part IV explains, recognition of
personhood may be reconciled with Roe because IVF arises outside of
177. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (2015); see also discussion supra Section II.C.
178. See Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 779-80 (“The term ‘public policy’ is of indefinite and
uncertain definition, and there is no absolute rule or test by which it can be always determined whether a contract contravenes the public policy of the state; but each case must be
determined according to the terms of the instrument under consideration and the circumstances peculiar thereto. In general, however, it may be said that any contract which conflicts with the morals of the times or contravenes any established interest of society is contrary to public policy. We must look to the Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions of
the state, to determine its public policy and that which is not prohibited by statute, condemned by judicial decision, nor contrary to the public morals contravenes no principle of
public policy.” (quoting Liggett v. Shriver, 164 N.W. 611, 612-13 (Iowa 1917))).
179. Id. at 780.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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the privacy context of bodily integrity. Additionally, some may argue
that regulating the decision-making authority of parents would
constitute government intrusion into privacy rights given that
parenting and family matters are subsumed in the fundamental right
to privacy.182 However, the Fertility Society stated that the gamete
providers should have the ultimate authority to make decisions
regarding pre-embryos “in the absence of specific legislation.”183
Accordingly, where there is legislation, such as that proposed here, it
is reasonable that parents’ decision-making authority may be regulated. Moreover, a state may justifiably impact procreative autonomy
through a public policy statement that describes the need for action.
Another objection may be that this status would hinder IVF
treatment. Davis, for example, makes several sweeping statements
that recognition of pre-embryos as persons would “doubtless” have
the effect of outlawing IVF programs in Tennessee,184 and that under
this view, an agreement about disposition would “obviously” be
unenforceable in the event of disagreement.185 This Note rejects the
Davis court’s assertions. IVF would not be outlawed, or rendered
obsolete, because this treatment would still provide a fruitful means
of procreation for people even without allowing for freezing, destruction, or donation to research. Storing, destroying, or researching
pre-embryos does not further the purpose of IVF because these
actions do not lead to the creation of a child; therefore, eliminating
them would not frustrate IVF treatment. Moreover, this legislation
would promote advances in IVF technology to find more effective
means of achieving successful pregnancy and childbirth without
long-term preservation of pre-embryos. Furthermore, an agreement
between parties would still be enforceable so long as the language in
the agreement was restricted to implantation in one of the parties or
an adoptive parent.
Yet another possible objection is that limiting the number of
pre-embryos created may increase costs and decrease the likelihood
of resulting pregnancy, burdening the right to procreate. The right to
procreate, however, would not be infringed by equally applied regulation because no one seeking to procreate would be automatically
prevented from exercising this right. Regulation would instead pro182. See D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 335 (Fla. 2013) (holding that a person’s fundamental liberty interest in parenting is specifically protected by the state constitution’s
privacy provision); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115 (Fla. 2004) (holding that there is a
constitutionally protected interest in preserving the family and raising one’s children).
183. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); see also Roman v. Roman, 193
S.W.3d 40, 50 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that parties may mutually agree on disposition
of frozen, stored pre-embryos before entering into IVF).
184. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
185. Id. at 597.
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mote the right to procreate because having a child, the only intended
result of the IVF process, would be the only outcome possible in
the event of successful treatment. Couples seeking solely to postpone
reproduction would be limited to freezing eggs and sperm separately.
While this may be less successful to treat infertility, there is no
fundamental right to postpone reproduction; such regulation would
not be a violation of an individual’s right to procreate, but a limitation on the specific means of procreation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note presents a framework for IVF regulation that Florida,
or any state, may adopt to prevent disputes about the disposition of
pre-embryos and resolve disputes that inevitably arise, while promoting respect for human life. If the proposed legislation were adopted,
other areas of IVF would need to be considered that are beyond the
scope of this Note. One example is the question of how to deal with
potentially millions of frozen, stored pre-embryos if they were to be
considered human beings.186
This Note advocates that public policy is served by recognition
of personhood for pre-embryos and that Florida has a compelling
interest in protecting potential life that extends to pre-embryos
in the IVF context by virtue of their viability. In addition to this
interest, Florida should consider that establishing the legal status of
pre-embryos would prevent courts from choosing among outcomedeterminative approaches that involve balancing individual’s equal
rights in seeking procreation and avoiding procreation. Additionally,
this personhood model would clarify IVF providers’ and progenitors’
rights with regard to pre-embryos and encourage couples to anticipate near-certain parenthood resulting from the IVF process. This is
consistent with the purpose of IVF, as people seeking treatment do so
solely with the intention of creating a child. Accordingly, Florida
should enact legislation to establish the legal status of pre-embryos
as persons to promote continuity in IVF and protect life.

186. See Lewin, supra note 114 (noting that there are perhaps a million frozen preembryos currently stored in the United States).

